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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE LAND BOARD,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.
STATE DEPARTMENT
AND GAME,

OF

FISH

10154

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal to determine whether sand and
gravel are mineral in character within the reservation of
Section 65-1-16, U. C. A. 1953, and in the event such substances are considered to be mineral, then to further determine whether the State Land Board is required to obtain the consent of the State agency using or holding the
land whereon the sand and gravel are situated, under the
provisions of Section 65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court held that sand and gravel were mineral in character and, therefore, reserved to the State under Section 65-1-16, and further held that the Land Board
had authority to lease sand and gravel as minerals without
obtaining the consent of the State agency using and holding the land.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant on appeal requests the court to classify sand
and gravel as non-mineral in character, or in the alternative, to hold that, even if they are mineral in character,
they may only be leased by the Land Board after it obtains
the consent of the State agency utilizing the lands where
the sand and gravel are s~ituated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The land in question is owned by the Utah State Department of Fish and Game and is all of Section 32, T. 3
S., R. 25 E., S. L. M. This land was a State school section
which was sold under contract to a private party, and a
patent from the State of Utah duly and regularly issued
to said purchaser under date of March 18, 1946, "reserving to the State of Utah, all coal and other minerals in the
above lands and to it, or persons authorized by it, the right
to prospect for, mine and remove coal and other minerals
from the same * * *" (Exhibits P-1, P-2).
The Department of Fish and Game thereafter purchased the land in question from the private party, with
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the private party reserving minerals in the same language
that the State had reserved minerals in the patent (T. 2).
In the late fall of 1963, the Land Board advised the Department of Fish and Game that it intended to lease the subject
land for sand and gravel purposes to a party who had made
application for such lease, and the Department of Fish and
Game replied that sand and gravel were not considered to
be minerals under rulings of the Attorney General's Office,
and that further, the Land Board was required to obtain
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game prior to
leasing any minerals on lands owned and controlled by the
Department, and that the Department could not give its
consent to a surface stripping of sand and gravel materials (T. 3 and 4). Thereafter the Land Board instituted
the present litigation for a determination that sand and
gravel were mineral in character within the meaning of
the statutory reservation, and the Department of Fish and
Game answered, denying that sand and gravel were minerals, and further setting up by way of an affirmative defense the fact that the Land Board must first obtain the
consent of the Department prior to leasing minerals on
Department land, and that such consent had reasonably
been withheld.
At the hearing in the lower court, it was stipulated
that there are certain quantities of sand and gravel on the
land in question and that these substances could be used
in a commercially feasible manner if located near areas
where there was a significant demand. Counsel for the
Land Board asked the court .to take judicial notice of the
communities in northeastern Utah where there might be
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a market for sand and gravel substances (T. 4-6). It is
reasonably clear from the stipulation that the sand and
gravel in question are common varieties without any peculiar or unique features.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SAND AND GRAVEL ARE NOT MINERALS
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 65-116, U. C. A. 1953.
The first question for determination is whether sand
and gravel are to be considered mineral deposits within
the meaning of Section 65-1-16, U. C. A. 1953, which provides as follows :
"All applications to purchase, approved subsequent to May 12, 1919, shall be subject to a reservation to the state of all coal and other mineral deposits in said lands, with the right to the state or
persons authorized by it to prospect for, mine and
remove the same as provided by law, and all certificates of sale and all patents issued therefor shall
contain such reservation."
It is clear that all minerals included within the above

language were reserved by the State of Utah when it issued
its patent under date of March 18, 1946, and the State still
holds and controls minerals so reserved in the section of
land in question. When the Department of Fish and Game
purchased the land, it acquired everything that the private
seller had obtained from the State of Utah, but, of course,
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did not acquire any greater rights than the State had re..
linquished to the private purchaser.

The State of Utah has never considered sand and
gravel to be minerals within the statutory language quoted
above. The specific question was raised, however, in 1955
when the State Land Board inquired as to whether these
substances could be considered minerals, and the Attorney
General ruled that they were not. See Opinion 55-088 issued under date of August 16, 1955 and appearing in Biennial Report of Attorney General, June 30, 1956, at page
166. After reviewing a number of cases, Attorney General
E. R. Callister observed :
"In view of the foregoing authorities, it is the
opinion of this office that gravel is not within the
meaning of our statute subject to reservation by the
State of Utah in the absence of express language in
the conveyance to that effect."
Then, under date of July 9, 1956, Attorney General
E. R. Callister answered a further question posed by the
State Land Board, i.e., whether clay could be considered a
mineral within the mineral reservation clause. See Opinion 56-075, dated July 9, 1956, Biennial Report of Attorney
General, June 30, 1958, at page 189. The Attorney General in that opinion reviewed a considerable number of
cases from Utah and other jurisdictions and concluded that
clay had a special intrinsic quality which justified its treatment as a mineral. But, the Attorney General was careful
to distinguish clay from sand and gravel :
"There are cases on both sides of this question
and an attempt has been made to reach a rational
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conclusion based upon the intention of the Legislature, and on a careful consideration of the intrinsic
qualities of clay itself as compared with ordinary
soil deposits or sand and gravel.
"* * ::!:
"Clay is to be distinguished from such other
components of the earth's under surface as sand
and gravel by its distinct mineral composition,
whereas sand and gravel for general commercial
use are merely aggregations of rocks or conglomerations of mineral fragments.
"* * *
"The value of sand and gravel as distinguished
from clay, usually is entirely dependent on location
and aocessibility, and they are not of distinct or unusual worth in and of themselves since substitutions
of other materials can be made in such filling, grading and cement making operations."
The following year the Attorney General was further
asked by the State Land Board whether volcanic cinders
could be considered mineral in character within the meaning of the mineral reserve clause. Attorney General E. R.
Callister concluded that volcanic cinders properly were
mineral in nature. See Opinion 57-031, issue4 under date
of April 11, 1957, appearing in Biennial Report of the
Attorney General, June 30, 1958, at page 195. Again the
Attorney General was careful to explain that sand and
gravel clearly were not mineral in character, even though
it might appear that they were similar in some respects to
volcanic cinders :
"The two types of substances which are the
common exceptions from the definition as minerals
when found under this state's surface are gravel
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and ordinary sand. They are valuable only in respect to their use as fill and in respect to their location. They are not generally considered to be intrinsically valuable in and of themselves.
"As to volcanic cinders, they might or might
not have intrinsic value, depending on the use to
which they are put. Certainly, they could be used
as sand and gravel are used.
"However, the usual use made of such cinders
is in the making of building blocks. Their unique
value in such process is their extremely light weight
combined with strength. Because of this they are
of more use than other substances in such construction."
It is submitted that the foregoing opinions of the Attorney General are correct, although it must be recognized
that there is a difference of judicial opinion as to whether
sand and gravel should be considered to be mineral in charaeter. The pattern of decisions relating to whether sand
and gravel could be minerals for the purpose of making
valid locations under the Federal mining laws is interesting. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Loney v. Scott, 57
Ore. 378, 112 Pac. 172, held that sand and gravel could be
considered mineral under the mining laws, and pointed out
the economic uses to which sand and gravel were then being employed. The Federal Land Department apparently
disagreed with the Loney conclusion. (See Zimmerman v.
Bennson, 39 L. D. 310; Lindley on Mines, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed.,
Sec. 93.) Thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior determined that sand and gravel could be considered mineral
in character. (See Layman v. Ellis, 52 L. D. 714 (1929)
and United States v. Barngrover, 57 I. D. 533 (1942) .)
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The most significant factor in the Federal pattern,
however, is that Congress did not agree with the geological niceties perceived by the Secretary of the Interior, and
in the Act of July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 611, Congress specifically provided:
"No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone,
gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no deposit
of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws
of the United States so as to give effective validity
to any mining claim hereafter located under such
mining laws."
It is obvious that Congress either never had intended
that sand and gravel should be considered to be minerals
locatable under the Federal mining laws, or that, if such
a treatment had been justified under earlier statutes, Congress felt that there was no longer any justification for
treating common varieties of such substances as mineral.
It is believed that the Utah Legislature would take the
same view if this court were to declare sand and gravel to
be mineral in their common varieties.

Utah case law on the question under discussion is not
very helpful. It is true that this court has ruled that minerals can include substances removed from the earth by
processes other than subterranean excavations. (See Nephi
Plaster and Manufacturing Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah
114, 93 Pac. 53 (1907), wherein it was held that gypsum
was a mineral.) The Utah court has also ruled that salt
in solution in the Great Salt Lake was mineral in character
because of the great quantity contained in the waters of
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tho lake. (See Deserct Livestock v. State, 110 Utah 239,
171 P. 2d 401 (1946)). However, there is no language in
the Utah cases suggesting that sand and gravel of common
varieties would be mineral. In fact, there is some rational
basis for believing that the general legislative intent was to
exclude common varieties of sand and gravel from the mineral reserve clause. These substances are commonly found
at or near the surface of the earth in a variety of mixtures
and qualities and are, in fact, part of the earth itself, and
in many cases part of the surface of the earth. Section
65-1-17, U. C. A. 1953, suggests that minerals are underground deposits as distinguished from surface substances :

"Lands in which minerals are reserved, the
surface of which has a value for other purposes,
may be sold under the provisions of law relating
to the sale of state lands, subject to such reservation."
Section 65-1-20, U. C. A. 1953, similarly distinguishes between surface uses by surface owners and mineral development and extraction by those having .mineral interests.
There simply is nothing in Utah legislation suggesting that
common varieties of sand and gravel were contemplated
by the Legislature in the mineral reserve clause.
Turning now to a consideration of general case law in
other jurisdictions, it must be admitted that there is a split
of judicial authority. All cases agree that common varieties of sand and gravel in marginal quantities, not commercially valuable, are not minerals within the meaning
of either a statutory reservation or a private reservation
or grant. The split in authority appears when usually val-
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uable deposits of sand and gravel of high quality or unique
characteristics are discovered. In such situations some
courts have held that those substances should be treated
as mineral and some courts have held that they should not.
It cannot be denied that sand and gravel are mineral in
nature within a very broad classification, because many
substances not considered to be mineral within the meaning of mineral grants and reservations must be classified
as mineral within such broad geological classifications.
This is illustrated by the following summary:
"While the word 'minerals' includes, in a technical sense, all natural inorganic substances forming a part of the soil, the term is used in so many
senses, dependent upon the context, that such a
definition is obviously too broad, for it would throw
little, if any, light upon what was meant in a particular case. So, to apply the word in the signification in which it is employed in the scientific division
of all matter into the traditional three kingdoms, to
a grant of land containing an exception of the minerals, would be absurd, since all land belongs to the
mineral kingdom, and the exception could not be
given effect without destroying the grant. * * *"
(Am. Jur., Vol. 36, page 283.)
But one should not be misled into thinking that such
a broad classification of the term "mineral" can have any
realistic probative value in ascertaining the legislative intent in the mineral reserve clause. While various substances
have been considered to be mineral in nature, the general
judicial rule is that sand and gravel are not:
"In application of the foregoing principles of
construction, an unqualified grant or reservation
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of minerals has been held to include not only the
coal, iron, etc., but also such substances as oil and
gas, diamonds, fluor spar, gypsum, granite, shale,
paint stone, pulpstone, freestone, and other substances. Limestone is not included in a grant or
reservation of minerals and neither is sand, gravel
or clay. * * * (Am. Jur., Vol. 36, Sec. 35, pp.
306-07.)

The foregoing general rule as stated by American J urisprudence is confirmed by Corpus Juris Secundum:
"In a broad, general sense, as belonging to one
of the three great divisions of matter, animal, vegetable, and mineral, gravel and sand may be considered as minerals, but in a commercial sense, they
have been held, according to the circumstances of
the particular case, to be minerals and also not to
be minerals." (C. J. S., Vol. 58, Sec. 2 (3), page
21.)
Speaking more specifically with regard to statutory
and deed language either granting or reserving minerals,
the following general rule is announced :
"Sand and gravel ordinarily are not included
within a grant or reservation of minerals or of mineral royalty, although there is on the land involved
sand or gravel susceptible of commercial production
and use. * * *" (C. J. S., Vol. 58, Sec. 155,
pp. 324-25.)
There are a great number of cases which could be
quoted and argued at length for both the pro and con position as to whether common varieties of sand and gravel
should be minerals. Generally, those cases holding sand
and gravel in commercially valuable deposits to be mineral,
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do so on the theory that such substances can be classified
as mineral within broad geological definitions, and further,
upon the ground that the legislative or grantor reservation
was to reserve anything of broad mineral character which
was commercially valuable beyond the specific purpose for
whi·ch the land was sold. Those cases holding common
varieties of sand and gravel not to be mineral in nature,
without regard to whether they appear in commercially
valuable deposits, have done so largely on the theory that
sand and gravel are so common and compose such a substantial part of the surface, and under surface, of the land
as to be beyond the statutory or grantor intent in the reservation of minerals; and further, that sand and gravel are
not any particular mineral, but simply fragments of a
great many different minerals (rocks) which have no
value as to the particular minerals, but only as to the fragmentary aggregate. The general feeling seems to be that
the Legislature, or the grantor, should specifically identify
and reserve such common substances as sand and gravel
if the intent is to reserve them, because otherwise they
would not ordinarily be considered within a mineral reserve clause and should, therefore, pass to the grantee.
It is submitted that the past rulings of the Utah Attorney General are correct; that the history and pattern of
mining locations under Federal statutes have shown that
sand and gravel in common varieties should not be consid.ered to be mineral; and that the statements quoted above
from American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum
accurately state the general rules of judicial construction
of mineral reserve clauses.
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Without detailing the .facts and rationale of each case,
the following list of authorities is suggested as fully supporting the above quoted general rule that sand and gravel
are not minerals :

Authorities

Cases:
Barker v. Mintz, 215 Pac. 534 (Colo., 1923)
Beck v. Harvey, 164 P. 2d 399 (Okla., 1944)
Farrel v. Sayre, 270 P. 2d 190 (Colo., 1954)
Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 58 A. 486 (Pa., 1904)
Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 9 So. 2d 228 (La., 1942)
Irion v. Lyons, 113 So. 857 (La.)
Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N. E. 537
(Ill., 1923)
Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 166 S. E. 351 (North Carolina, 1932)
Lord Provost of Glasgow v. Farie, L. R., 13 App. Cas. 657
Psencik v. Wessells, 205 S. W. 2d 658 (Tex. 1947)
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128
S. W. 2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.)
Staples v. Young, 1 Ir. Rep. 135 (1908)
State v. Hendrix, 167 P. 2d 43 (Okla., 1946)
Steinman Development Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co.,
290 Fed. 832 (D. C., 1922)
U. S. v. Aitken, 25 Philippine 7, 14
Waring v. Foden, 1 Ch. 276 (Eng., 1936)
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Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S. W. 2d 981
(Tex. Civ. App.)
Winsett v. Watson, 206 S. W. 2d 656 (Tex., 1947)
Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss.)

Treatises:
17 A. L. R. 166
86 A. L. R. 969, 989
1 A. L. R. 2d 790
It is believed that the court's attention should be called
to a matter of practical consequence. The issue on appeal
will have a stare decisis result which will affect every person who has purchased lands from the State of Utah. Up
to this point, the Land Board, as well as the purchasers,
has believed that sand and gravel were not minerals and,
therefore, that these sustances passed with the land to the
purchaser. This is obvious from the fact that the Land
'Board has accepted and relied upon the opinions from the
Attorney General's office for the last nine years without
questioning them in any legal proceeding until the present
one. No private owners of land purchased from the State
are parties to this proceeding. But, if this court determines
that common varieties of sand and gravel are mineral
within the meaning of the reserve clause, these private
parties will automatically be divested of a valuable aspect
of ownership which both they and the Land Board previously thought had passed to private ownership.

Another practical problem is that the Land Board
presently is leasing as sand and gravel simple fill dirt
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which is utilized by the Department of Highways in the
construction of the freeway program and other road projects. Perhaps no particular problem is involved when a
lease of that nature is executed between two State agencies of that type. But a problem has arisen in the instant
case in that deposits of sand and gravel could be sold by
the lessee for fill dirt purposes. It might be argued that
the sand and gravel could not be extracted from the earth
unless it was being used for specific commercial sand and
gravel purposes and not as fill dirt, but the practical fact
is if the lessee removes the substances containing some
common varieties of sand and gravel, he is doing so because it is commercially practicable for him to do so. It
would thus be difficult to judicially regulate the removal
of the surface of the earth which had some deposits of sand
and gravel in order to determine wh~ther these substances,
after their removal, were being utilized for a legitimate
purpose.

In various parts of the State of Utah, the Department
of Fish and Game has re-seeded many bench lands to
greatly improve their value for wildlife grazing. A type of
gravel appears in all of these lands, and if the Land Board
can lease these gravel deposits to the Department of Highways or to private road contractors, the entire surface of
these areas can be stripped and used as fill dirt. It is
doubtful whether the Department of Fish and Game could
be protected under any bond or other arrangement required
for the protection of surface owners. (See Section 65-1-20,
U. C. A. 1953.) The discussion immediately above simply

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
illustrates that private landowners who have purchased
land from the State would be in a similar position if the
Land Board could likewise lease their lands for a variety
of purposes which would serve to excuse extensive surface
stripping to remove sand and gravel substances.
It is, therefore, believed that the Legislature did not
intend common varieties of sand and gravel to be reserved
to the State under the mineral reserve clause, and that this
court should declare such substances to be non~mineral in
nature, at least so far as the mineral reserve clause is concerned.
POINT II.
THE LAND BOARD CANNOT LEASE ANY
MINERALS ON LAND HELD OR USED BY
OTHER STATE AGENCIES WITHOUT FIRST
OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF THE AGENCY SO CONCERNED.
If the court concludes that the common varieties of
sand and gravel are not included within the mineral reserve clause, then it is unnecessary to consider this point.
But, if the court holds that sand and gravel are mineral in
character so as to be included within the reservation, then
appellant contends that the Land Board must still obtain
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game, because
that Department owns, controls, and beneficially utilizes
the land in question for wildlife purposes.
Section 65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows:
"Mineral leases of all state lands, shall be made
exclusively by the land board with the consent of
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the state agency using or holding such land. The
proceeds from mineral leases in all state lands with
the exception of trust lands administered by the
land board, shall be deposited in the general fund."
It is difficult to see how the above language is susceptible of any other interpretation. The statute includes
all mineral leases of all State lands, and says that such
leases shall be made exclusively by the Land Board with
the consent of the State agency using or holding such land.
The statute does not say that mineral leases may be made
by the Land Board without the consent of the State agency.
The position of the Land Board in this case and the holding
of the lower court was exactly to that effect. How it can
be eontended or how it can be held that a statute requiring
the consent of the State agency can mean that the consent
of the State agency is not required is beyond the imagination of the appellant.
It is submitted that the State agency using or holding

the land cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably refuse to give
its consent. Certainly the legitimate interests of the agency
using or holding the land must be balanced with the economic benefits to be derived by the State in the mineral
lease proposed by the Land Board. If the Land Board felt
in a particular instance that the State agency was being
unreasonable and that the interests which the agency desired to protect were of less significance than the benefits
to be derived from a mineral lease, it is clear that the Land
Board could bring an appropriate action to show that consent was unreasonably being withheld by the agency, and
the court could judicially declare that the consent must be
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given in view of the respective interests of the State of
Utah.
But that issue is not involved here. There is no allegation or claim that the Department of Fish and Game in any
respect had been unreasonable in withholding its consent.
In fact, counsel for the Land Board stated in open court
that:
al will stipulate there are valid reasons that
the State Department of Fish and Game would
have, based upon their functions in game management, wild life management, which would reasonably allow them, in good faith, to refuse to lease the
sand and gravel on the subject lands for exploitation." (T. 4.)

The obvious intent of the ,Legislature was that the
Land Board not be allowed to issue mineral leases on lands
being actively and beneficially used by other agencies without coordinating with such agencies, informing them of
the nature and scope of the proposed mineral lease and obtaining the consent of the agency concerned.
A practice not directly material in this case but which
justifies brief mention to illustrate a related problem is the
following: The Department of Fish and Game purchases
with its own funds (derived from the sale of hunting and
fishing licenses and not from tax monies) large tracts of
land from private owners who own mineral rights.
The Department does not buy mineral rights but it
always insists upon language in the conveyance declaring
that sand and gravel are not minerals and that they, there-
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fore, pass as part of the surface ownership to the Department. This is so because the lands thus purchased would
be greatly damaged if sand and gravel could be removed
by the grantor who reserved mineral rights. But after the
lands are thus purchased by the Department, they become
State land, even though the Department by statute is authorized to hold title in its own name. (Section 23-2-20,
U. C. A. 1953.) Does this mean that the State Land Board
can issue mineral leases on common varieties of sand and
gravel obtained by the Department through the purchases
discussed above? If so, the concern of the Department in
excluding sand and gravel from the grantor's mineral reservation would be a hollow protection, because the Land
Board could immediately .lease the sand and gravel to the
same grantor and he then could do the very thing which
the Department did not want him to do. The Department
would not have purchased the land if the grantor had not
agreed to convey sand and gravel. What a strange sequence
of events there would be if the same grantor could thus
obtain the same sand and gravel which he conveyed to the
Department by leasing the same from the State Land
Board. No objection would be made if such a mineral
lease of sand and gravel were to be issued only after the
consent of the Department had been given, but to permit
the Land Board to issue such leases without obtaining such
consent is not only impractical and unreasonable - it is
directly contrary to the very clear requirement of Section
65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953.
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CONCLUSION
Common varieties of sand and gravel, even though
available in quantities which would justify a commercial
use, should not be considered to be minerals within the
meaning of the mineral reserve clause of Section 65-1-16,
U. C. A. 1953.
Even if this court should hold that sand and gravel are
minerals within the mineral reserve clause, it is clear that
when these minerals appear on lands owned or used by
other State agencies, the Land Board must obtain the consent of the agency involved and cannot arbitrarily issue
such leases without obtaining such consent.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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